# The Intergenerational Effects of Parental Leave Policies: *Exploiting Forty Years of Variation in the U.S.*

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#### Motivation and Broader Research Questions

Are job-protected leave policies beneficial for children in the long run?

- It has been well-documented that the birth of a child is associated with a reduction in mothers' labor supply (intensive+extensive margins) and earnings
  - $\rightarrow\,$  To what extent can job-protected family leave policies ameliorate this motherhood penalty?
- Are these policies effective at increasing parental time investments?
- Do these policies ultimately translate into improved child outcomes in the long run?
  - $\rightarrow$  Are there any intergenerational implications?

# Family Policies and Children's Outcomes

In documenting positive effects of exposure to job-protected leave at the time of birth on the long-term education and labor market returns of children in the United States, we contribute to the following body of work:

- Long-run outcomes: Dahl, Loken, Mogstad, and Salvanes (2015), Carneiro, Loken, and Salvanes (2014), Dustmann and Schonberg (2012), Ginja, Jans, and Karimi (2020)
- Short-term and medium-term outcomes: Rossin (2011), Stearns (2015), Huebener, Kuehnle, and Spiess (2019)

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where existing evidence is mixed, mostly due to differences in:

- Countries studied in the literature
- Type of policy variation analyzed: *Creation* of *new* policies vs. *Extensions* of *existing* policies
- Relatively scarce literature focused on the United States

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- Relatively scarce literature focused on the United States

Our intergenerational results are novel to this literature as we show that the long-term effects on children ultimately had intergenerational effects

## Parental Responses to Family Policies

In providing evidence of higher parental investments in children among parents exposed to job-protected leave despite the stronger negative career effects on mothers exposed to job-protected leave, we contribute to the following body of work:

- Parental investments: Ginja, Jans, and Karimi (2020)
- Career effects: Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2013), Baum and Ruhm (2013), Bartel, Baum, Rossin-Slater, and Ruhm (2014), Lalive, Schlosser, Steinhauer, and Zweimuller (2014), Bailey, Byker, Patel, an Ramnath (2019), Ginja, Karimi and Xiao (2019)
- Fertility: Averett and Whittington (2001), Lalive and Zweimuller (2009)

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- Fertility: Averett and Whittington (2001), Lalive and Zweimuller (2009)

where existing evidence is

- Mostly focused on career effects of family policies
- Scarce relating the effect of these policies on parental investments in children
- Even less is known about the fertility effects of leave policies

### Institutional Context

We focus on the set of job-protected leave policies implemented before the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act.



Geographic Variation in Family Leave Policy Implementation in the U.S.

### Data

We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics spanning the time period 1968-2017

- Specifically, we use information on sociodemographic characteristics and labor market outcomes of parents and children from the Family-Individual File
- We supplement this data with information from the Family Identification Mapping System (FIMS) to accurately create parent-child links

Altogether, this allows us to:

- Capture long-term education and labor market outcomes of children born before 1993 (the pre-FMLA period)
- Compute intergenerational mobility measures
- Capture parental decisions and labor market outcomes around childbirth

# A Staggered Treatment Econometric Model

- Let  $\mathcal{G}$  denote the set of treatment years  $\rightarrow \mathcal{G} = \{1973, 1974, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991\}$
- Define a *treated cohort*  $G_g$  as the set of states who implemented a job-protected leave policy at time t = g.
  - ightarrow For instance,  $G_{1970}$  corresponds to the set of states that become treated on 1970
- $G_{\infty}$  denotes the set of states that did not implement a job-protected leave before FMLA (1993)
- Treatment is an absorbing state: once a state becomes treated, it remains treated for the remainder of the sample
- $y_{it}^g$  denotes i's potential outcomes in period t if she belongs to cohort g
- $y_{it}^\infty$  denotes i 's potential outcome if she belongs to any of the states in  $G_\infty$























Given the staggered implementation of these policies, we can identify the causal effect of these policies within a difference-in-differences framework if:

- (A1) There is no treatment effect heterogeneity across time or treated units/cohorts
- (A2) Parallel trends
- (A3) There are no confounding effects:
  - Geographic variation in state-level taxation and welfare
  - Differential capabilities of outsourcing child care: presence of grandparents in close proximity

#### Treatment Timing Heterogeneity

A Diff-in-Diff estimator can then generally be characterized in the following way:

$$\alpha^{FL} = \sum_{t \ge g} \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \omega_{gt} \alpha_{gt}$$

where:

$$\alpha_{gt} = \mathbb{E}[y_{it}^g - y_{it}^{\infty} | g \neq \infty]; \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{t \ge g} \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \omega_{gt} = 1$$

where  $\alpha^{FL}$  can fail to capture ATT when there is at least one g such that  $\alpha_{gt} < 0$  and  $\alpha_{gt}$  is varying across time and treated units. (A1) imposes  $\alpha_{at} = \bar{\alpha}$ 

## **Empirical Strategy**

Under our identifying assumptions, we can estimate the impact of these pre-FMLA policies using the following regression:

$$Y_{istg} = \alpha_0 + \alpha^{FL} F L_{st} + \eta_s + \eta_t + \epsilon_{ist}$$

where:

- *FL<sub>st</sub>* denotes an indicator of exposure to a pre-FMLA job-protected leave policy in state *s* and reference time period *t*.
  - $\rightarrow\,$  For parental outcomes, the reference time period is the survey year
  - $\rightarrow$  For child and intergenerational outcomes, the reference time period is the birth year
- $\eta_s$  and  $\eta_t$  captures state-specific and reference year-specific fixed effects

# **Intergenerational Mobility**

## Research Design

Consider parent-child links characterized in the following way:

- The child was born before 1993 and classified into any of the two groups:
  - → **Treated:** Children whose birth year falls **after** the implementation of a job-protected leave policy in a state that belongs to any of the treated cohorts  $\{G_g | g \in \mathcal{G}\}$  (that is,  $birth\_year \ge g$ ) or whose birth year falls **before** the implementation of a job-protected leave policy policy in a state that belongs to any of the treated cohorts  $\{G_g | g \in \mathcal{G}\}$  (that is,  $birth\_year < g$ )
  - → **Control:** Children who are born in a state belonging to  $G_{\infty}$  before [if  $s \in G_{\infty}$ ,  $birth\_year \ge g$ ] or after [if  $s \in G_{\infty}$ ,  $birth\_year < g$ ]

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- We observe the child and the parent in the panel at the age of 25

We construct the following for both the child and the parent in the link:

- Parent's rank in the education and earnings distribution at the age of 25  $(R^P)$
- Child's rank in the education and earnings distribution at the age of 25  $(R^{C})$

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We check (1) the correlation between  $R^C$  and  $R^P$ , and (2) how this correlation was affected by exposure to pre-FMLA job-protected leave

#### Education Rank Correlations: Mother and Child



Overall

By Policy

## Rank-Rank Correlations in Education: Mother and Child

	No Policy	Interactions	Including Policy Interactions							
	All Children		All C	hildren	Daug	ghters	Sons			
Dep. Var.: Education Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Education Rank, Mother	0.283***	0.210***	0.299***	0.210***	0.313***	0.204***	0.286***	0.215***		
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)		
Female		0.032***		0.035***						
		(0.005)		(0.005)						
Leave Reform			2.168	2.241	3.433	3.809*	0.890	0.704		
			(1.539)	(1.448)	(2.254)	(2.109)	(2.125)	(2.007)		
Leave Reform $\times$ Education Rank, Mother			-0.090***	-0.088***	-0.081**	-0.099***	-0.102***	-0.086**		
			(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.034)		
Constant	57.524***	71.296***	56.399***	68.840***	58.670***	74.999***	53.766***	66.006***		
	(2.851)	(3.048)	(2.853)	(3.112)	(4.278)	(4.643)	(3.688)	(4.018)		
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Sociodemographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes		
N	9819	9819	9819	9466	4833	4641	4986	4825		

## Rank-Rank Correlations in Education: Mother and Child

	No Policy	Interactions	Including Policy Interactions							
	All Children		All Cl	All Children		Daughters		Sons		
Dep. Var.: Education Rank, Child	(1) (2)		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Education Rank, Mother	0.283***	0.210***	0.299***	0.210***	0.313***	0.204***	0.286***	0.215***		
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)		
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## Upward Education Mobility: Mother and Child

Our measure of upward intergenerational mobility captures the probability that a child reaches a rank greater than her mother's conditional on the mother's rank being in the bottom 3 quartiles:

	All Children		Daug	ghters	Sons		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Leave Reform	0.063***	0.070***	0.062**	0.057*	0.055*	0.072**	
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	
Female		0.000***					
		(0.000)					
Constant	0.889***	0.994***	0.896***	1.007***	0.889***	1.033***	
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.091)	
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Sociodemographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
N	7328	6992	3625	3442	3703	3550	

#### Earnings Rank Correlations: Mother and Child



By Policy - Daughters

By Policy - Sons

# Rank-Rank Correlations in Earnings: Mother and Child

	No P	olicy Intera	ctions	Including Policy Interactions							
	All	Daughters	Sons	All Children		Daughters		Sons			
Dep. Var.: Earnings Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
Earnings Rank, Mother	0.177***	0.246***	0.118***	0.195***	0.171***	0.266***	0.244***	0.121***	0.113***		
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.036)		
Female	-0.107***				-0.108***						
	(0.012)				(0.012)						
Leave Reform				-2.502	-5.386	-4.275	-7.221	-1.027	-0.102		
				(5.363)	(5.270)	(6.942)	(6.900)	(9.293)	(9.418)		
Leave Reform × Earnings Rank, Mother				0.033	0.048	-0.036	-0.012	0.076	0.056		
				(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.121)	(0.122)		
Constant	37.008***	20.425*	45.473***	37.928***	36.576***	39.871***	19.029*	37.359***	45.866***		
	(7.931)	(10.703)	(11.904)	(5.640)	(7.969)	(7.640)	(10.852)	(8.307)	(11.864)		
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes		
N	1934	1041	893	1941	1934	1046	1041	895	893		

# Rank-Rank Correlations in Earnings: Mother and Child

	No P	olicy Intera	ctions	Including Policy Interactions							
	All	Daughters	Sons	All Children		Daughters		Sons			
Dep. Var.: Earnings Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
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Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes		
N	1934	1041	893	1941	1934	1046	1041	895	893		

### Education Rank Correlations: Father and Child



Overall

By Policy
## Rank-Rank Correlations in Education: Father and Child

	No P	olicy Intera	ctions		Inc	luding Poli	cy Interacti	ons	
		All Children		All C	hildren	Daug	ters	hters So	
Dep. Var.: Education Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Education Rank, Father	0.273***	0.242***	0.157***	0.264***	0.181***	0.274***	0.189***	0.256***	0.173***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Female			0.016***		0.017***				
			(0.006)		(0.006)				
Leave Reform				0.653	1.491	2.987	4.247*	-1.191	-0.836
				(1.718)	(1.599)	(2.544)	(2.358)	(2.348)	(2.203)
Leave Reform $\times$ Education Rank, Father				-0.099***	-0.106***	-0.099**	-0.108***	-0.115***	-0.114***
				(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.039)
Constant	36.327***	66.420***	83.025***	64.860***	81.470***	77.166***	96.395***	59.141***	74.001***
	(0.621)	(4.266)	(4.593)	(4.259)	(4.581)	(7.189)	(7.870)	(4.900)	(5.417)
Birth Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ν	6589	6537	6455	6537	6455	3156	3118	3381	3337

## Rank-Rank Correlations in Education: Father and Child

	No P	olicy Intera	ctions		Inc	luding Poli	cy Interacti	ons	
	All Children		All C	hildren	Dau	hters Sons		ons	
Dep. Var.: Education Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Education Rank, Father	0.273***	0.242***	0.157***	0.264***	0.181***	0.274***	0.189***	0.256***	0.173***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)
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			(0.006)		(0.006)				
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Birth Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ν	6589	6537	6455	6537	6455	3156	3118	3381	3337

## Upward Education Mobility: Father and Child

Our measure of upward intergenerational mobility captures the probability that a child reaches a rank greater than her father's conditional on the father's rank being in the bottom 3 quartiles:

	All Cl	hildren	Daug	ghters	Sc	ons
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Leave Reform	0.025	0.015	0.023	0.016	0.025	0.009
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Female		0.000				
		(0.000)				
Constant	0.941***	1.122***	1.100***	1.316***	0.860***	1.010***
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.122)	(0.136)	(0.120)	(0.130)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	4664	4588	2250	2215	2414	2373

#### Earnings Rank Correlations: Father and Child



By Policy - Daughters

By Policy - Sons

## Rank-Rank Correlations in Earnings: Father and Child

	No Po	olicy Interac	tions		Incl	uding Polic	y Interactio	ns	
	All	Daughters	Sons	All C	hildren	Daug	ters	So	ons
Dep. Var.: Earnings Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Earnings Rank, Father	0.224***	0.239***	0.259***	0.308***	0.246***	0.267***	0.258***	0.368***	0.283***
	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Female	-0.119***				-0.119***				
	(0.014)				(0.014)				
Leave Reform				5.218	7.261	10.670	13.058	10.279	8.692
				(6.401)	(6.417)	(8.728)	(8.855)	(9.751)	(9.638)
Leave Reform $\times$ Earnings Rank, Father				-0.168*	-0.177*	-0.115	-0.149	-0.248*	-0.229*
				(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.131)
Constant	37.465***	44.250***	15.481	36.731***	36.193***	48.223***	44.001***	24.124**	13.013
	(10.657)	(16.609)	(14.594)	(7.451)	(10.818)	(10.565)	(16.736)	(10.524)	(15.032)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ν	1449	748	745	1458	1449	754	748	749	745

## Rank-Rank Correlations in Earnings: Father and Child

	No Po	olicy Interac	tions		Incl	uding Polic	y Interactio	ns	
	All	Daughters	Sons	All C	hildren	Daug	ghters	Sa	ons
Dep. Var.: Earnings Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Earnings Rank, Father	0.224***	0.239***	0.259***	0.308***	0.246***	0.267***	0.258***	0.368***	0.283***
	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Female	-0.119***				-0.119***				
	(0.014)				(0.014)				
Leave Reform				5.218	7.261	10.670	13.058	10.279	8.692
				(6.401)	(6.417)	(8.728)	(8.855)	(9.751)	(9.638)
Leave Reform $\times$ Earnings Rank, Father				-0.168*	-0.177*	-0.115	-0.149	-0.248*	-0.229*
				(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.131)
Constant	37.465***	44.250***	15.481	36.731***	36.193***	48.223***	44.001***	24.124**	13.013
	(10.657)	(16.609)	(14.594)	(7.451)	(10.818)	(10.565)	(16.736)	(10.524)	(15.032)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ν	1449	748	745	1458	1449	754	748	749	745

## Rank-Rank Correlations in Earnings: Father and Child

	No Po	olicy Interac	tions		Incl	uding Policy	y Interactio	ns	
	All	Daughters	Sons	All C	hildren	Daug	ters	Sa	ons
Dep. Var.: Earnings Rank, Child	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Earnings Rank, Father	0.224***	0.239***	0.259***	0.308***	0.246***	0.267***	0.258***	0.368***	0.283***
	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Female	-0.119***				-0.119***				
	(0.014)				(0.014)				
Leave Reform				5.218	7.261	10.670	13.058	10.279	8.692
				(6.401)	(6.417)	(8.728)	(8.855)	(9.751)	(9.638)
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				(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.131)
Constant	37.465***	44.250***	15.481	36.731***	36.193***	48.223***	44.001***	24.124**	13.013
	(10.657)	(16.609)	(14.594)	(7.451)	(10.818)	(10.565)	(16.736)	(10.524)	(15.032)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ν	1449	748	745	1458	1449	754	748	749	745

## Summary of Results

#### Intergenerational Mobility in Education:

- Exposure to pre-FMLA policies reduced the correlation between children's education rank and their mother's education rank
- ✓ These results hold when looking at the correlation between children's education rank and their father's education rank

#### Intergenerational Mobility in Earnings:

- Exposure to pre-FMLA policies did not affect the correlation between earnings's education rank and their mother's earnings rank
- ✓ However, exposure to these policies reduced the correlation between children's earnings rank and their father's earnings rank
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Effect driven by the correlation with sons' earnings

# **Long-Run Child Outcomes**

• Consider the aforementioned classification of children born before 1993 by exposure to job-protected leave policies at birth

- Consider the aforementioned classification of children born before 1993 by exposure to job-protected leave policies at birth
- Given our long panel, we observe the following:
  - (1) The sociodemographic characteristics of the child
  - (2) The sociodemographic characteristics of the child's mother at the time of the child's birth and her labor supply prior to the child's birth
  - (3) The child's completed education and labor market returns at adulthood (ages 25-30)

- Consider the aforementioned classification of children born before 1993 by exposure to job-protected leave policies at birth
- Given our long panel, we observe the following:
  - (1) The sociodemographic characteristics of the child
  - (2) The sociodemographic characteristics of the child's mother at the time of the child's birth and her labor supply prior to the child's birth
  - (3) The child's completed education and labor market returns at adulthood (ages 25-30)
- Analyze how exposure to pre-FMLA job-protected leave affected children's completed education and labor market returns at adulthood once we control for the variables described in (1) and (2).
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Also capturing heterogeneous effects by mothers' characteristics at baseline

#### Pre-FMLA Leave Policies and Children's Completed Education

	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.274***	0.231*	1.316***	1.58/***
	(0.082)	(0.129)	(0.294)	(0.324)
Leave Reform $\times$ High School, Mother			-1.104***	-0.816**
			(0.324)	(0.344)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			-1.375***	-1.014***
0.1			(0.316)	(0.334)
Leave Reform × College Mother			_1 206***	-0.573
			(0.216)	(0.250)
			(0.510)	(0.350)
Leave Reform × Part-time, Mother				-0.052
				(0.198)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				-0.389*
				(0.206)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				-0.643**
				(0.295)
Leave Reform × Black Mother				-0.305
				(0.303)
Laura Deferma de Illionania, Mathan				(0.302)
Leave Reform × Hispanic, Wother				-0.027
_				(0.372)
Constant	11.810***	10.292***	10.084***	10.075***
	(0.231)	(0.326)	(0.334)	(0.336)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

#### Pre-FMLA Leave Policies and Children's Completed Education

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.274***	0.231*	1.316***	1.587***
	(0.082)	(0.129)	(0.294)	(0.324)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-1.104***	-0.816**
			(0.324)	(0.344)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			-1.375***	-1.014***
			(0.316)	(0.334)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			-1.206***	-0.573
			(0.316)	(0.350)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				-0.052
				(0.198)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				-0.389*
				(0.206)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-0.643**
				(0.295)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.305
				(0.302)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.027
				(0.372)
Constant	11.810***	10.292***	10.084***	10.075***
	(0.231)	(0.326)	(0.334)	(0.336)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.058***	-0.041**	-0.143***	-0.217***
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.041	-0.023
			(0.047)	(0.049)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			0.093*	0.020
			(0.048)	(0.050)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			0.163***	0.075
			(0.049)	(0.053)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Part-time, Mother				0.089***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				0.090***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				0.105***
				(0.037)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				0.065*
				(0.039)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.067
				(0.049)
Constant	0.078**	0.243***	0.278***	0.283***
	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.058***	-0.041**	-0.143***	-0.217***
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.041	-0.023
			(0.047)	(0.049)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			0.093*	0.020
			(0.048)	(0.050)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			0.163***	0.075
			(0.049)	(0.053)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Part-time, Mother				0.089***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				0.090***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				0.105***
				(0.037)
Leave Reform $\times$ Black, Mother				0.065*
				(0.039)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.067
•				(0.049)
Constant	0.078**	0.243***	0.278***	0.283***
	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	` Yes ´	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.058***	-0.041**	-0.143***	-0.217***
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Leave Reform $\times$ High School, Mother			0.041	-0.023
			(0.047)	(0.049)
Leave Reform × Some College, Mother			0.093*	0.020
0.1			(0.048)	(0.050)
Leave Reform × College Mother			0 163***	0.075
Leave Reform × Conege, Mother			(0.040)	(0.052)
			(0.049)	(0.055)
Leave Reform × Part-time, Mother				0.089***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				0.090***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				0.105***
				(0.037)
Leave Reform × Black Mother				0.065*
Leave Reform × Diack, Mother				(0.000)
				(0.039)
Leave Reform × Hispanic, Mother				-0.067
				(0.049)
Constant	0.078**	0.243***	0.278***	0.283***
	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
11.3				
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.058***	-0.041**	-0.143***	-0.217***
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.041	-0.023
			(0.047)	(0.049)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			0.093*	0.020
			(0.048)	(0.050)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			0.163***	0.075
			(0.049)	(0.053)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				0.089***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				0.090***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				0.105***
				(0.037)
Leave Reform $\times$ Black, Mother				0.065*
				(0.039)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.067
				(0.049)
Constant	0.078**	0.243***	0.278***	0.283***
	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	` Yes ´	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.018	0.034	0.173***	0.172***
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.061)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.163***	-0.126*
			(0.063)	(0.071)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			-0.275***	-0.233***
			(0.064)	(0.072)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			-0.095	0.029
			(0.060)	(0.077)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				0.063
				(0.042)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				0.027
				(0.045)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-0.085
				(0.066)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.060
				(0.066)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.109
				(0.075)
Constant	-0.213***	-0.409***	-0.422***	-0.418***
	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.018	0.034	0.173***	0.172***
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.061)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.163***	-0.126*
			(0.063)	(0.071)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			-0.275***	-0.233***
			(0.064)	(0.072)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			-0.095	0.029
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Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				0.063
				(0.042)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				0.027
				(0.045)
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				(0.066)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.060
				(0.066)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.109
				(0.075)
Constant	-0.213***	-0.409***	-0.422***	-0.418***
	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.018	0.034	0.173***	0.172***
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.061)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.163***	-0.126*
			(0.063)	(0.071)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			-0.275***	-0.233***
			(0.064)	(0.072)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			-0.095	0.029
			(0.060)	(0.077)
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				(0.042)
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				(0.045)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				-0.085
				(0.066)
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				(0.066)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.109
				(0.075)
Constant	-0.213***	-0.409***	-0.422***	-0.418***
	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	17010			
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.018	0.034	0.173***	0.172***
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.061)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.163***	-0.126*
			(0.063)	(0.071)
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			(0.064)	(0.072)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			-0.095	0.029
			(0.060)	(0.077)
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				(0.042)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				0.027
				(0.045)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				-0.085
				(0.066)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.060
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Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.109
				(0.075)
Constant	-0.213***	-0.409***	-0.422***	-0.418***
	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
21	17010	7465	7465	7465
IN	1/218	7465	7465	7465

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	2.940***	2.642***	0.956	-0.674
	(0.855)	(0.777)	(1.034)	(1.995)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.426	-0.324
			(1.059)	(1.160)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.519	0.559
			(1.334)	(1.458)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			5.384***	4.270**
			(1.820)	(1.796)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Part-time, Mother				1.279
				(1.061)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				2.489*
				(1.394)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				1.444
				(1.918)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				1.275
				(1.875)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				0.223
				(2.802)
Constant	-10.924***	-10.874***	-9.827***	-9.534***
	(2.027)	(1.992)	(1.996)	(2.015)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
хт.	1005			1051
N	4926	4854	4854	4854

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	2.940***	2.642***	0.956	-0.674
	(0.855)	(0.777)	(1.034)	(1.995)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.426	-0.324
			(1.059)	(1.160)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.519	0.559
			(1.334)	(1.458)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			5.384***	4.270**
			(1.820)	(1.796)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				1.279
				(1.061)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				2.489*
				(1.394)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				1.444
				(1.918)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				1.275
				(1.875)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				0.223
				(2.802)
Constant	-10.924***	-10.874***	-9.827***	-9.534***
	(2.027)	(1.992)	(1.996)	(2.015)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4926	4854	4854	4854

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	2.940***	2.642***	0.956	-0.674
	(0.855)	(0.777)	(1.034)	(1.995)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.426	-0.324
			(1.059)	(1.160)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.519	0.559
			(1.334)	(1.458)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			5.384***	4.270**
			(1.820)	(1.796)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				1.279
				(1.061)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				2.489*
				(1.394)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				1.444
				(1.918)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				1.275
				(1.875)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				0.223
				(2.802)
Constant	-10.924***	-10.874***	-9.827***	-9.534***
	(2.027)	(1.992)	(1.996)	(2.015)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	1005			
N	4926	4854	4854	4854

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	2.940***	2.642***	0.956	-0.674
	(0.855)	(0.777)	(1.034)	(1.995)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.426	-0.324
			(1.059)	(1.160)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.519	0.559
			(1.334)	(1.458)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			5.384***	4.270**
			(1.820)	(1.796)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				1.279
				(1.061)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				2.489*
				(1.394)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				1.444
				(1.918)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				1.275
				(1.875)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				0.223
• •				(2.802)
Constant	-10.924***	-10.874***	-9.827***	-9.534***
	(2.027)	(1.992)	(1.996)	(2.015)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4926	4854	4854	4854

		( 1 )
(2)	(3)	(4)
** 3.922*	2.871	5.751*
3) (2.060)	(1.924)	(3.194)
	-0.715	0.596
	(2 020)	(3 366)
	1 220	1.641
	1.220	1.041
	(2.700)	(3.656)
	3.560	3.899
	(3.487)	(4.190)
	( )	0 473
		(1.024)
		(1.934)
		5.625*
		(2.875)
		-5.146
		(4 246)
		6 100
		-0.109
		(4.408)
/*** -12.910**	* -12.033***	-12.126***
6) (3.728)	(3.741)	(3.720)
Yes	Yes	Yes
7 1642	1642	1642
	7*** -12.910** 6) (3.728) 7 1642	*** 3.922* 2.871   (1.924) -0.715 (2.020)   1.220 (2.700) 3.560   (3.487) (3.487)   7*** -12.910*** -12.033***   (36) (3.728) (3.741)   (27) Yes Yes   (27) (27) (27)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	4.451**	3.922*	2.871	(5.751*)
	(2.183)	(2.060)	(1.924)	(3.194)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.715	0.596
			(2.020)	(3.366)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.220	1.641
			(2.700)	(3.656)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			3.560	3.899
			(3.487)	(4.190)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother			. ,	0.473
				(1.934)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				5.625*
				(2.875)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				-5.146
				(4.246)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-6.109
				(4.408)
Constant	-13.277***	-12.910***	-12.033***	-12.126***
	(4.066)	(3.728)	(3.741)	(3.720)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1647	1642	1642	1642

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	4.451**	3.922*	2.871	(5.751*)
	(2.183)	(2.060)	(1.924)	(3.194)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.715	0.596
			(2.020)	(3.366)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.220	1.641
			(2.700)	(3.656)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			3.560	3.899
			(3.487)	(4.190)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Part-time, Mother				0.473
				(1.934)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				5.625*
				(2.875)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-5.146
				(4.246)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-6.109
				(4.408)
Constant	-13.277***	-12.910***	-12.033***	-12.126***
	(4.066)	(3.728)	(3.741)	(3.720)
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1647	1640	1640	1640
1N	1047	1042	1042	1042

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Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1647	1642	1642	1642

## Summary of Results

- ✓ We find a significant **increase** in children's completed education in response to exposure to pre-FMLA policies
  - ightarrow Mostly stemming from a significant lower high school dropout probability
- ✓ There are also significant **positive effects** in children's average wages at the ages between 25-30
  - → Unconditional [not causal parallel trends violation]
  - → Conditional [causal failed to reject parallel trends]
- $\checkmark$  Our results are robust to treatment timing heterogeneity corrections

# **Parental Investments in Children**

• Focus on the sub-sample of women (and men) of child-bearing age

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- Consider an event-study specification such that:
  - $\rightarrow$  An event is the birth of the first child
  - ightarrow The time period includes 3 years before the event and 10 years after the event
  - $\rightarrow\,$  The outcomes of interest are measures of parental investments in children:
    - 1. Annual housework hours (that includes time spent in child care)
    - 2. Household monetary expenditure

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  - $\rightarrow$  The time period includes 3 years before the event and 10 years after the event
  - $\rightarrow$  The outcomes of interest are measures of parental investments in children:
    - 1. Annual housework hours (that includes time spent in child care)
    - 2. Household monetary expenditure
- Categorize parents into two groups:
  - → **Policy:** Parents who were exposed to pre-FMLA job-protected leave at the time of first childbirth (i.e. treated)
  - $\rightarrow$  **No Policy:** Parents who were *not* exposed to pre-FMLA job-protected leave at the time of first childbirth (i.e. control)

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  - $\rightarrow$  **No Policy:** Parents who were *not* exposed to pre-FMLA job-protected leave at the time of first childbirth (i.e. control)
- Implementing the event study for both groups separately captures differential changes in parental investments on children upon first childbirth based on exposure to pre-FMLA job-protected leave
#### First Childbirth and Parental Home Time Hours



#### First Childbirth and Child Care Costs



## Summary of Results

#### Time Investments

- ✓ Significant increase in both parents' total housework hours upon the birth of their first child
  - $\rightarrow$  Higher increase among mothers exposed to pre-FMLA leave policies

#### Monetary Investments

- ✓ Significant increase in parents' expenditures on child care after their first childbirth.
  - → **Extensive margin:** Slightly *higher increase* among parents exposed to pre-FMLA policies than among parents' not exposed to these policies
  - $\rightarrow$  **Intensive margin:** No significant heterogeneity in this increase between parents exposed to pre-FMLA policies and parents' not exposed to these policies

## **Parental Labor Market Outcomes**

Consider the event study design aforementioned:

- An event is the birth of the first child
- The time period includes 3 years before the event and 10 years after the event
- The dependent variables relate mothers' and fathers' labor market outcomes in children:
  - 1. Annual earnings
  - 2. Annual hours worked
  - 3. Participation rate
  - 4. Wage rate
- Consider the previously defined **Policy** and **No Policy** groups of parents
- Implementing the event study for both groups separately captures differential changes in parental labor market outcomes upon first childbirth based on exposure to pre-FMLA job-protected leave

#### First Childbirth and Mothers' Labor Market Outcomes



#### First Childbirth and Fathers' Labor Market Outcomes



#### Summary of Results

- ✓ Significant **decrease** in mothers' labor supply upon the birth of their first child
  - $\rightarrow$  Both at the extensive and intensive margin
- ✓ Significant **decrease** in mothers' earnings associated with the birth of their first child
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Consistent with the so-called motherhood penalty documented in the literature
- ✓ We find that the corresponding motherhood penalty is **larger** among mothers exposed to pre-FMLA leave policies at the time of birth
- $\checkmark$  We do not find comparable results among our placebo group  $\rightarrow$  fathers

## Fertility

- Classify individuals of child-bearing age into two groups to capture exposure to pre-FMLA leave policies at a given year *t*:
  - → **Treated:** Resides in a state *s* belonging to any of the treated cohorts  $\{G_g | g \in \mathcal{G}\}$ and *t* falls **after** the implementation of a job-protected leave policy in state *s* [if  $s \in G_g, t \ge g$ ] or resides in a state *s* belonging to any of the treated cohorts and *t* falls **after** the implementation of a job-protected leave policy in state *s* [if  $s \in G_g, t < g$ ]
  - → **Control:** Resides in a state belonging to  $G_{\infty}$  before [if  $s \in G_{\infty}, t \ge g$ ] or after [if  $s \in G_{\infty}, t < g$ ]

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- Our outcome of interest is the yearly probability of having a child
- Upon controlling for individual characteristics (X<sub>ist</sub>), capture the differential impact of exposure to pre-FMLA policies among the groups:
- (G1) Individuals with no children before the implementation of job-protected leave in their state of residence
- (G2) Individuals who have had a child before the implementation of job-protected leave in their state of residence

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- Our outcome of interest is the yearly probability of having a child
- Upon controlling for individual characteristics (X<sub>ist</sub>), capture the differential impact of exposure to pre-FMLA policies among the groups:
- (G1) Individuals with no children before the implementation of job-protected leave in their state of residence
- (G2) Individuals who have had a child before the implementation of job-protected leave in their state of residence
- This can be captured in a two-way fixed effects regression:

$$\underbrace{B_{ist}}_{\text{Birth prob.}} = \alpha_0 + \underbrace{\alpha_0^{FL}}_{\text{Effect on}} FL_{st} + \underbrace{\alpha_+^{FL}}_{\text{Effect on}} (FL_{st} \times \underbrace{K_{ig}}_{\text{Kids,}}) + \beta X_{ist} + \eta_t + \eta_s + \epsilon_{ist}$$

# Fertility (Women), No Birth Before Policy: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, N	Never-Treated as a Comparison G	Group
----------------------------------------	---------------------------------	-------

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	0.044	0.008	5.600	0.000	0.028	0.059
Pre_avg	0.000	0.002	0.090	0.928	-0.004	0.004
Post_avg	0.036	0.016	2.340	0.019	0.006	0.067

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as a Comparison Group

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	0.0440	0.0078	5.6300	0.0000	0.0287	0.0593
$Pre_avg$	0.0002	0.0021	0.0900	0.9270	-0.0039	0.0043
$Post_avg$	0.0371	0.0156	2.3800	0.0170	0.0066	0.0677

## Fertility (Women), Positive Number of Births Before Policy: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as a Comparison Group

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	-0.0726	0.0360	-2.0200	0.0440	-0.1432	-0.0021
Pre_avg	0.0038	0.0080	0.4700	0.6400	-0.0120	0.0195
Post_avg	-0.1483	0.1855	-0.8000	0.4240	-0.5118	0.2153

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as a Comparison Group

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	-0.0715	0.0357	-2.0000	0.0450	-0.1414	-0.0016
Pre_avg	0.0037	0.0081	0.4600	0.6470	-0.0122	0.0197
$Post_avg$	-0.1480	0.1843	-0.8000	0.4220	-0.5093	0.2133

# Fertility (Men), No Birth Before Policy: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as a Comparison Group

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	0.0277	0.0065	4.24	0.000	0.0149	.04045
Pre_avg	0.0024	0.0024	1.00	0.320	-0.0023	0.0071
Post_avg	0.0306	0.0114	2.67	0.008	0.0081	0.0530

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as a Comparison Group

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	0.0271	0.0065	4.18	0.000	0.0144	0.0398
Pre_avg	0.0024	0.0024	1.00	0.318	-0.0023	0.0070
$Post_avg$	0.0301	0.0114	2.63	0.009	0.0077	0.0525



## Fertility (Men), Positive Number of Births Before Policy: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as a Comparison Group

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	-0.1067	0.0285	-3.75	0.000	-0.1625	-0.0509
Pre_avg	-0.0047	0.0077	-0.61	0.540	-0.0199	0.0104
Post_avg	-0.2153	0.1207	-1.78	0.074	-0.4518	0.0213

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as a Comparison Group

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	pvalue	LB	UB
ATT	-0.1059	0.0284	-3.73	0.000	-0.1616	-0.0502
Pre_avg	-0.0050	0.0077	-0.64	0.520	-0.0201	0.0102
$Post_avg$	-0.2149	0.1207	-1.78	0.075	-0.4515	0.0217

# Women's Probability of Having a Child, by Number of Children at Baseline

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.002	-0.006*	0.009***	0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Parity			-0.016***	-0.025***
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.089***	0.129***	0.093***	0.138***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	168616	160893	168616	160893

[1] Mean at baseline: 0.092. [2] Sociodemographic controls include: age, education,

marital status, race, and lagged labor supply

#### Men's Probability of Having a Child, by Number of Children at Baseline

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.000	-0.007**	0.008***	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Leave Reform $\times$ Parity			-0.016***	-0.018***
			(0.002)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.217***	0.063***	-0.212***	0.050**
	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	177247	169702	177247	169702

[1] Mean at baseline: 0.075. [2] Sociodemographic controls include: age, education, marital status, race, and lagged labor supply

We find that:

- ✓ There is a significant increase in the probability of having a child among women and men who have had no kids prior to the availability of family leave policies
- ✓ There is a significant decrease in the probability of having a child among women and men who have had kids prior to the availability of family leave policies

## Threats to Identification

#### Treatment Timing Heterogeneity

- Check the robustness of our results to estimators that allow for treatment to vary across treated cohorts and over time
- Implement the Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) estimator
- This estimator allows us to simultaneously test how sensitive our results are to changes in the comparison group used
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Using never treated units as the control group
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Using not-yet treated units as the control group
- Results from the main specifications used for children's long-term outcomes, intergenerational effects, and parents' fertility decision are robust in terms of direction and magnitude
  - $\rightarrow$  Lost some significance for some results due to the increase in standard errors upon the bootstrapping needed for this estimator (such as high school dropout likelihood and children's wages at adulthood)



#### Threats to Identification

#### Violation of Parallel Trends

- We test parallel trends using an event study specification
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Coefficients associated with years prior to the implementation of the policies serve as a way to test the validity of this assumption
- Overall, we fail to reject parallel trends for most outcomes
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Focusing on the window including up to 4 years before the policies
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Some exceptions include children's unconditional average wages at adulthood and men's likelihood of having their first kid.



#### Threats to Identification

#### Potential Confounders

- We focus on two main potential sources of confounding effects:
  - 1. The presence of grandparents in proximity
  - 2. Differences in state taxation and welfare
- We add controls for these potential confounders in our main specifications
- Overall, our results are robust to accounting for these potential confounders



#### **Concluding Remarks**

We find evidence that

- Pre-FMLA policies reduced the correlation between parental and children's educational attainment
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Leading to an increase in educational intergenerational mobility when comparing mothers' and their children's educational attainment
- Such intergenerational results can be rationalized by improved long-run education outcomes and labor market outcomes of children among children exposed to these policies at birth
- A potential mechanism for these effects can be attributed to higher parental investments in kids upon childbirth among parents exposed to these policies
- Mothers exposed to these policies experienced a relatively larger motherhood penalty
- Exposure to these policies has affected parental fertility decisions

Thank you!

# Appendix

#### Completed Education: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	-0.098	0.460**	0.336	1.160**
	(1.157)	(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.534)

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors.

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	-0.106	0.437*	0.337	1.150**
	(1.155)	(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.525)

#### Less than High School: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	-0.117***	-0.079**	-0.064	-0.015
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.052)

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors.

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	-0.114***	-0.073*	-0.061	-0.012
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.052)

#### College: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	0.031	0.032	0.013	0.239**
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.118)

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors.

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	0.033	0.037	0.022	0.244**
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.116)

#### Unconditional Average Wages: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	-0.291	0.191	1.000	0.676
	(2.771)	(1.697)	(2.465)	(2.476)

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors.

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	-0.025	0.242	1.540	0.676
	(2.779)	(1.715)	(2.343)	(2.490)

#### Conditional Average Wages: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Never-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	4.474	1.839	4.542	18.030
	(5.543)	(3.142)	(4.981)	(30.510)

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors.

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ATT	4.607	1.453	4.036	4.602
	(5.528)	(3.164)	(4.698)	(36.327)



# Upward Intergenerational Mobility: Treatment Timing Heterogeneity Checks

	Callaway-Santanna	Estimates for	r ATT,	Never-Treated	as	Comparison	Group
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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATT	0.228**	0.283**	0.163	0.238	0.272**	0.329*
	(0.094)	(0.127)	(0.145)	(0.187)	(0.124)	(0.196)

Last specification chi2(78) = 64.5440, p-value = 0.8626 [Fail to reject parallel trends]

Callaway-Santanna Estimates for ATT, Not-Yet-Treated as Comparison Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATT	0.220**	0.281**	0.158	0.228	0.265**	0.344*
	(0.094)	(0.125)	(0.143)	(0.177)	(0.123)	(0.189)

Last specification chi2(78) = 65.2449, p-value = 0.8482 [Fail to reject parallel trends]

## Completed Education: Pre-Trend Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
-12yrs	-1.091	-1.108	-0.982	-0.886
	(0.805)	(1.131)	(0.746)	(1.052)
-10yrs	-0.910	-0.894	-0.784	-0.671
	(0.652)	(0.922)	(0.604)	(0.854)
-8yrs	-0.662	-0.608	-0.567	-0.424
	(0.500)	(0.705)	(0.465)	(0.659)
-буrs	-0.442	-0.294	-0.337	-0.182
	(0.377)	(0.539)	(0.349)	(0.497)
-4yrs	-0.220	-0.115	-0.100	-0.088
	(0.259)	(0.377)	(0.240)	(0.343)
-2yrs	-0.113	0.214	-0.031	0.175
	(0.219)	(0.329)	(0.204)	(0.298)
+2yrs	0.361	0.378	0.453*	0.413
	(0.265)	(0.367)	(0.246)	(0.337)
+4yrs	0.546	0.948	0.626	0.731
	(0.414)	(0.584)	(0.382)	(0.540)
+6yrs	0.893	1.066	1.063**	1.034
	(0.564)	(0.780)	(0.524)	(0.721)
+8yrs	1.498**	1.895*	1.542**	1.592*
	(0.724)	(0.999)	(0.667)	(0.924)
+10yrs	1.951**	2.119*	1.919**	1.688
	(0.832)	(1.156)	(0.766)	(1.072)
+12yrs	2.164**	2.238	2.121**	1.938
	(0.973)	(1.370)	(0.898)	(1.265)
Female	0.469***	0.509***	0.474***	0.556***
	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.046)	(0.065)
Sociodemographics, Mother	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor Supply, Mother	No	No	No	Yes
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	8964	3623	8926	3623



## Less than High School: Pre-Trend Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
-12yrs	0.080	0.008	0.064	-0.014
	(0.120)	(0.140)	(0.118)	(0.140)
-10yrs	0.039	-0.022	0.026	-0.040
	(0.097)	(0.115)	(0.096)	(0.114)
-8yrs	0.034	-0.018	0.020	-0.034
	(0.075)	(0.087)	(0.074)	(0.087)
-буrs	0.015	-0.050	0.002	-0.062
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.068)
-4yrs	0.021	-0.047	0.007	-0.051
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.049)
-2yrs	0.024	-0.068	0.013	-0.063
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.045)
+2yrs	-0.047	-0.086*	-0.058	-0.088*
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.045)
+4yrs	-0.103*	-0.114	-0.110*	-0.097
	(0.062)	(0.073)	(0.061)	(0.072)
+6yrs	-0.132	-0.152	-0.148*	-0.140
	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.082)	(0.094)
+8yrs	-0.142	-0.178	-0.147	-0.158
	(0.106)	(0.119)	(0.104)	(0.118)
+10yrs	-0.167	-0.172	-0.168	-0.145
	(0.123)	(0.144)	(0.121)	(0.142)
+12yrs	-0.221	-0.169	-0.222	-0.148
	(0.144)	(0.170)	(0.142)	(0.168)
Female	-0.035***	-0.042***	-0.035***	-0.048***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Sociodemographics, Mother	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor Supply, Mother	No	No	No	Yes
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	8964	3623	8926	3623



## College: Pre-Trend Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
-12yrs	-0.243	-0.290	-0.232	-0.250
	(0.157)	(0.252)	(0.148)	(0.237)
-10yrs	-0.223*	-0.230	-0.206*	-0.186
	(0.127)	(0.204)	(0.120)	(0.192)
-8yrs	-0.157	-0.156	-0.147	-0.121
	(0.097)	(0.156)	(0.091)	(0.147)
-буrs	-0.126*	-0.110	-0.115*	-0.090
	(0.073)	(0.118)	(0.069)	(0.110)
-4yrs	-0.060	-0.044	-0.048	-0.043
	(0.049)	(0.081)	(0.046)	(0.075)
-2yrs	-0.052	-0.034	-0.044	-0.040
	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.036)	(0.063)
+2yrs	0.069	0.085	0.077*	0.087
	(0.048)	(0.078)	(0.044)	(0.072)
+4yrs	0.061	0.151	0.069	0.107
	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.073)	(0.118)
+6yrs	0.136	0.174	0.157	0.168
	(0.107)	(0.173)	(0.100)	(0.163)
+8yrs	0.297**	0.375*	0.296**	0.312
	(0.136)	(0.221)	(0.127)	(0.207)
+10yrs	0.379**	0.384	0.361**	0.292
	(0.162)	(0.259)	(0.151)	(0.242)
+12yrs	0.397**	0.438	0.378**	0.368
	(0.189)	(0.303)	(0.177)	(0.284)
Female	0.076***	0.081***	0.077***	0.090***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Sociodemographics, Mother	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor Supply, Mother	No	No	No	Yes
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	8964	3623	8926	3623



## Unconditional Average Wages: Pre-Trend Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
-12yrs	-18.491**	-17.419**	-18.155**	-14.241*
	(8.836)	(8.877)	(8.270)	(7.806)
-10yrs	-15.062**	-14.147*	-14.264**	-11.004*
	(7.264)	(7.300)	(6.796)	(6.418)
-8yrs	-11.928**	-11.258**	-11.619**	-9.089*
	(5.485)	(5.512)	(5.147)	(4.895)
-буrs	-7.606*	-7.011*	-7.432**	-5.669
	(3.947)	(3.981)	(3.683)	(3.461)
-4yrs	-5.285*	-5.025*	-5.761**	-4.714*
	(2.913)	(2.937)	(2.771)	(2.594)
-2yrs	0.473	0.717	-0.602	-0.066
	(1.838)	(1.876)	(1.705)	(1.627)
+2yrs	6.775**	6.578**	5.647**	5.117**
	(2.757)	(2.771)	(2.619)	(2.475)
+4yrs	11.075***	10.623**	9.436**	8.067**
	(4.239)	(4.259)	(3.989)	(3.773)
+6yrs	16.395***	15.699***	15.396***	12.418**
	(6.034)	(6.057)	(5.631)	(5.373)
+8yrs	18.103**	17.218**	15.626**	12.022*
	(7.835)	(7.855)	(7.314)	(6.919)
+10yrs	22.585***	21.861**	20.282**	16.711**
	(8.744)	(8.797)	(8.234)	(7.815)
+12yrs	25.019**	23.756**	24.298**	19.149**
	(10.815)	(10.855)	(10.136)	(9.608)
Female	-0.513	-0.559	-0.436	-0.383
	(0.373)	(0.378)	(0.347)	(0.330)
Sociodemographics, Mother	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor Supply, Mother	No	No	No	Yes
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	2706	2652	2699	2652


#### Conditional Average Wages: Pre-Trend Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
-12yrs	-27.372*	-29.344*	-27.611*	-30.364**
	(16.332)	(16.310)	(15.452)	(14.821)
-10yrs	-22.454*	-24.350*	-21.954*	-24.415**
	(13.368)	(13.351)	(12.695)	(12.135)
-8yrs	-16.955	-18.245*	-16.765*	-19.577**
	(10.535)	(10.517)	(9.947)	(9.619)
-буrs	-9.807	-10.879	-10.049	-11.228*
	(7.334)	(7.334)	(6.956)	(6.667)
-4yrs	-3.659	-4.613	-4.891	-6.961
	(5.212)	(5.225)	(5.132)	(4.909)
-2yrs	1.722	2.076	1.807	-2.225
	(4.584)	(4.655)	(4.221)	(4.302)
+2yrs	13.430**	13.107*	12.398*	10.748*
	(6.621)	(6.697)	(6.531)	(5.994)
+4yrs	21.890***	21.555**	18.902**	17.427**
	(8.367)	(8.434)	(8.131)	(7.638)
+6yrs	25.589**	25.727**	25.175**	23.035**
	(11.140)	(11.205)	(10.766)	(10.084)
+8yrs	36.290**	36.374**	33.678**	32.118**
	(15.366)	(15.381)	(14.596)	(13.686)
+10yrs	38.250**	38.588**	33.828**	33.083**
	(17.110)	(17.135)	(16.250)	(15.311)
+12yrs	43.402**	43.836**	39.084**	37.461**
	(20.365)	(20.311)	(19.362)	(18.287)
Female	-0.701	-0.705	-0.373	-0.125
	(0.744)	(0.755)	(0.711)	(0.688)
Sociodemographics, Mother	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor Supply, Mother	No	No	No	Yes
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	810	803	805	803



#### Fertility, No Births Before Policy: Pre-Trend Checks

	М	len	Women		
	(1)	(1) (2)		(4)	
-12yrs	-0.017	-0.017	0.001	0.000	
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.022)	
-10yrs	-0.009	-0.009	-0.003	-0.003	
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	
-8yrs	-0.009	-0.009	0.003	0.003	
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
-буrs	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	0.004	
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	
-4yrs	0.003	0.003	0.009	0.009	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
-2yrs	0.019***	0.019***	0.007	0.007	
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
+2yrs	0.010	0.010	0.001	0.001	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
+4yrs	0.013	0.013	0.008	0.008	
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
+6yrs	0.019	0.019	0.002	0.002	
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
+8yrs	0.021	0.021	0.006	0.006	
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	
+10yrs	0.034	0.034	0.013	0.013	
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
+12yrs	0.041	0.041	0.013	0.013	
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.026)	
Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Ν	78648	78648	92967	92967	

#### Fertility, Positive Number of Births Before Policy: Pre-Trend Checks

	M	len	Wo	men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
-12yrs	0.029	0.029	0.086	0.086
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.054)
-10yrs	0.016	0.015	0.050	0.050
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.044)
-8yrs	0.007	0.006	0.038	0.038
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.034)
-буrs	0.005	0.005	0.018	0.018
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.023)
-4yrs	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)
-2yrs	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
+2yrs	-0.020	-0.019	-0.034**	-0.034**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
+4yrs	-0.028	-0.028	-0.053**	-0.053**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.026)
+6yrs	-0.067	-0.067	-0.088**	-0.088**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.036)
+8yrs	-0.067	-0.066	-0.104**	-0.104**
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.047)
+10yrs	-0.062	-0.062	-0.103*	-0.103*
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.056)
+12yrs	-0.084	-0.083	-0.137**	-0.137**
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ν	35470	35470	45667	45667



### Completed Education: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.214**	0.211	1.306***	1.584***
	(0.090)	(0.136)	(0.301)	(0.332)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-1.101***	-0.811**
			(0.325)	(0.345)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Some College, Mother			-1.374***	-1.011***
			(0.317)	(0.335)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			-1.207***	-0.571
			(0.317)	(0.352)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				-0.048
				(0.198)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				-0.388*
				(0.206)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-0.652**
				(0.297)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.307
				(0.303)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.023
				(0.374)
Constant	10.686***	9.119***	9.039***	9.032***
	(0.775)	(1.107)	(1.114)	(1.111)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ar.	17010	7465	7465	7465
N	17218	7465	7465	/465

## Less than High School: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.053***	-0.042**	-0.147***	-0.223***
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.042	-0.024
			(0.047)	(0.050)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Some College, Mother			0.093*	0.020
			(0.048)	(0.051)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			0.164***	0.075
			(0.050)	(0.053)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Part-time, Mother				0.089***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				0.090***
				(0.028)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				0.109***
				(0.037)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				0.067*
				(0.039)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.070
				(0.049)
Constant	0.192	0.351*	0.382*	0.372*
	(0.145)	(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.206)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	17010			
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

## College: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.019	0.035	0.176***	0.176***
	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.056)	(0.062)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.163***	-0.125*
			(0.063)	(0.072)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Some College, Mother			-0.276***	-0.232***
			(0.064)	(0.072)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			-0.097	0.030
			(0.061)	(0.077)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				0.063
				(0.042)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				0.027
				(0.045)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				-0.089
				(0.066)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.061
				(0.066)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.108
				(0.076)
Constant	-0.312**	-0.564***	-0.555***	-0.562***
	(0.143)	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.213)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	17218	7465	7465	7465

#### Unconditional Average Wages: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	2.748 ***	2.724 ***	1.021	-0.539
	(0.977)	(0.897)	(1.155)	(2.088)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			0.386	-0.359
			(1.071)	(1.172)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.449	0.497
			(1.346)	(1.469)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			5.386 ***	4.285 **
			(1.821)	(1.800)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother			. ,	1.312
				(1.063)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				2.498 <sup>*</sup>
				(1.395)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				1.319
				(1.929)
Leave Reform $\times$ Black, Mother				1.187
				(1.889)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				0.055
•				(2.797)
Constant	-14.772 **	-14.843 ***	-14.762 ***	-14.681 ***
	(6.065)	(5.675)	(5.659)	(5.671)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	4926	4854	4854	4854

#### Conditional Average Wages: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	4.909**	4.624**	3.612*	6.128*
	(2.480)	(2.353)	(2.138)	(3.412)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.658	0.623
			(1.928)	(3.218)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Some College, Mother			0.954	1.335
			(2.656)	(3.521)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			3.502	3.852
			(3.364)	(4.045)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Part-time, Mother				0.497
				(1.931)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				5.609**
				(2.853)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-4.893
				(4.110)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-5.635
				(4.259)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				0.000
				(.)
Constant	-41.206**	-34.195*	-33.512*	-35.086*
	(20.305)	(18.485)	(18.347)	(18.256)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	1647	1642	1642	1642
	1011	10-12	10-12	1012

# Upward Intergenerational Mobility, Mother: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Leave Reform	0.073***	0.083***	0.073*	0.074*	0.066*	0.084**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Female		0.000***				
		(0.000)				
Constant	0.214	0.355	-0.886	-0.658	1.386	1.214
	(0.870)	(0.894)	(1.233)	(1.263)	(1.241)	(1.277)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	7328	6992	3625	3442	3703	3550

# Upward Intergenerational Mobility, Father: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Leave Reform	-0.012	-0.017	-0.011	-0.011	-0.018	-0.030
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Female		0.000				
		(0.000)				
Constant	5.630**	5.400**	9.242***	9.310***	1.627	0.988
	(2.250)	(2.311)	(3.134)	(3.178)	(3.272)	(3.388)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4664	4588	2250	2215	2414	2373

## Fertility, Women: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.004***	0.005***	0.004***	0.005***	0.003***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age Squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Parity	0.065***	0.063***	0.065***	0.063***	0.068***	0.068***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Completed Years of Education	-0.001***	0.004***	-0.001***	0.004***	-0.001***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hispanic	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Black	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Married	0.006**	0.011***	0.006**	0.011***	0.009***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Total Years Worked, Past 5 Years		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Predicted Log Earnings		-0.016***		-0.016***		-0.014***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Leave Reform		. ,	-0.000	-0.003	0.009***	0.015***
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Leave Reform $\times$ Parity					-0.015***	-0.024***
					(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.263***	0.290***	0.263***	0.285***	0.253***	0.275***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	168616	160893	168616	160893	168616	160893

## Fertility, Men: State-Level Taxation and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.021***	0.023***	0.021***	0.023***	0.021***	0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age Squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Parity	0.064***	0.063***	0.064***	0.063***	0.068***	0.067***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Completed Years of Education	-0.001***	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hispanic	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Black	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Married	0.016***	0.022***	0.016***	0.023***	0.018***	0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Total Years Worked, Past 5 Years		0.001***		0.001***		0.001**
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Predicted Log Earnings		-0.028***		-0.028***		-0.026***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Leave Reform			0.000	-0.005*	0.007**	0.005
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Leave Reform $\times$ Parity					-0.015***	-0.017***
					(0.002)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.039*	0.201***	-0.039	0.196***	-0.046*	0.172***
	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.029)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	177247	169702	177247	169702	177247	169702



### Completed Education: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.206*	0.284*	0.642**	0.908**
	(0.125)	(0.159)	(0.299)	(0.379)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.361	-0.257
			(0.330)	(0.361)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			-0.572*	-0.440
			(0.332)	(0.353)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			-0.358	-0.187
			(0.364)	(0.387)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				-0.050
				(0.257)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				-0.143
				(0.284)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-0.459
				(0.401)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.225
				(0.399)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Hispanic, Mother				-1.299
				(0.805)
Constant	13.434***	12.578***	12.461***	12.386***
	(0.350)	(0.426)	(0.433)	(0.445)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Granparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	6056	4112	4112	4112

## Less than High School: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	-0.040*	-0.033	-0.059	-0.094
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.059)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.027	-0.045
			(0.048)	(0.050)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			0.027	0.011
			(0.050)	(0.051)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			0.121**	0.085
			(0.057)	(0.060)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				0.122***
				(0.036)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				0.069* <sup>*</sup>
				(0.032)
Leave Reform $\times$ White, Mother				-0.000
				(0.053)
Leave Reform × Black. Mother				-0.044
				(0.055)
Leave Reform × Hispanic, Mother				-0.295***
				(0.100)
Constant	-0.018	0.041	0.062	0.051
	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Granparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	6056	4112	4112	4112

## College: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	0.030	0.062*	0.083	0.100
	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.075)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.059	-0.039
			(0.065)	(0.075)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			-0.088	-0.068
			(0.070)	(0.078)
Leave Reform $ imes$ College, Mother			0.104	0.116
			(0.074)	(0.083)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				0.067
				(0.055)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Full-Time, Mother				0.055
				(0.067)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-0.083
				(0.087)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				-0.095
				(0.088)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				-0.395***
				(0.122)
Constant	0.235***	0.017	0.023	0.000
	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Granparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	6056	4112	4112	4112

#### Unconditional Average Wages: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	2.885***	2.613***	0.928	-0.711
	(0.854)	(0.776)	(1.034)	(2.003)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother	. ,	. ,	0.425	-0.314
			(1.060)	(1.159)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.527	0.583
			(1.343)	(1.460)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			5.381***	4.280**
			(1.829)	(1.802)
Leave Reform $\times$ Part-time, Mother				1.270
				(1.058)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				2.434*
				(1.396)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				1.458
				(1.924)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black, Mother				1.299
				(1.880)
Leave Reform $\times$ Hispanic, Mother				0.236
				(2.804)
Constant	-10.720***	-10.841***	-9.802***	-9.494***
	(2.105)	(2.085)	(2.105)	(2.133)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Granparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4937	4865	4865	4865

### Conditional Average Wages: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leave Reform	4.347**	3.889*	2.821	5.782*
	(2.161)	(2.043)	(1.938)	(3.196)
Leave Reform $ imes$ High School, Mother			-0.682	0.680
			(1.996)	(3.330)
Leave Reform $\times$ Some College, Mother			1.244	1.704
			(2.704)	(3.646)
Leave Reform $\times$ College, Mother			3.605	3.989
			(3.473)	(4.175)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Part-time, Mother			. ,	0.373
				(1.914)
Leave Reform $\times$ Full-Time, Mother				5.469*
				(2.896)
Leave Reform $ imes$ White, Mother				-5.169
				(4.238)
Leave Reform $ imes$ Black. Mother				-6.129
				(4.394)
Leave Reform × Hispanic. Mother				0.000
				(.)
Constant	-13.369***	-13.252***	-12.341***	-12.399***
	(4.148)	(3.832)	(3.882)	(3.855)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother's Labor Supply, Baseline	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Granparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1653	1648	1648	1648

### Upward Intergenerational Mobility, Mother: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Leave Reform	0.064***	0.072***	0.062**	0.058*	0.057*	0.075**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Female		0.000***				
		(0.000)				
Constant	0.925***	1.021***	0.897***	1.024***	0.958***	1.072***
	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.097)	(0.082)	(0.094)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Grandparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	7328	6992	3625	3442	3703	3550

## Upward Intergenerational Mobility, Father: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Leave Reform	-0.034	-0.041	-0.052	-0.053	-0.021	-0.033
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Female		0.000				
		(0.000)				
Constant	6.598***	6.198***	7.866***	8.023***	4.931*	4.012
	(1.872)	(1.901)	(2.616)	(2.636)	(2.719)	(2.779)
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
State-Year Taxation and Welfare Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	6537	6455	3156	3118	3381	3337

#### Fertility, Women: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.004***	0.005***	0.004***	0.005***	0.004***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age Squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Parity	0.067***	0.068***	0.067***	0.068***	0.070***	0.071***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Completed Years of Education	-0.000	0.003***	-0.000	0.003***	-0.000	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hispanic	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Black	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Married	0.030***	0.034***	0.030***	0.034***	0.031***	0.034***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Years Worked, Past 5 Years		-0.000		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Predicted Log Earnings		-0.009***		-0.009***		-0.009***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Leave Reform			-0.003	-0.004	0.009**	0.011***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Leave Reform $\times$ Parity					-0.019***	-0.022***
					(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.069***	0.078***	0.068***	0.077***	0.073***	0.084***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grandparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
۵r	110004	112751	110004	110751	110004	110751
2N	119004	113/51	119004	113/51	119004	113/51

## Fertility, Men: Presence of Grandparents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.022***	0.024***	0.022***	0.024***	0.021***	0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age Squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Parity	0.068***	0.069***	0.068***	0.069***	0.072***	0.071***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Completed Years of Education	-0.001***	0.000*	-0.001***	0.000*	-0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hispanic	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Black	0.010***	0.009***	0.010***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Married	0.040***	0.044***	0.040***	0.044***	0.041***	0.044***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Years Worked, Past 5 Years		0.002***		0.002***		0.002***
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Predicted Log Earnings		-0.031***		-0.031***		-0.030***
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Leave Reform			0.001	-0.004	0.009***	0.004
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Leave Reform $\times$ Parity					-0.019***	-0.016***
					(0.003)	(0.004)
Constant	-0.219***	0.059**	-0.219***	0.061**	-0.213***	0.056**
	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.026)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grandparents Presence in Same State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	125915	120504	125915	120504	125915	120504